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ABSTRACT
This article provides an empirically based, interdisciplinary approach to the following two questions: Do animals
possess behavioral and cognitive characteristics such as culture, language, and a theory of mind? And if so, what are
the implications, when long-standing criteria used to justify differences in moral consideration between humans and
animals are no longer considered indisputable? One basic implication is that the psychological needs of captive
animals should be adequately catered for. However, for species such as great apes and dolphins with whom we
share major characteristics of personhood, welfare considerations alone may not suffice, and consideration of basic
rights may be morally warranted—as for humans. Although characteristics supporting the status of personhood are
present to differing degrees among the diverse array of animal species, this is a barrier to moral consideration only if
anthropocentric, exclusive, and monolithic viewpoints about the necessary prerequisites for personhood are applied.
We examine the flaws inherent within such positions and argue for inalienable species-appropriate rights.

Introduction
1

The comparison of the cognitive abilities of adults with those of children and of humans with those of
2
nonhuman animals (hereafter “animals”) have long been topics of significant philosophical interest.
Considered sources of “pure natural behavior,” children and animals have provided valuable insights into
human nature, which have supported the proposition that the human adult is what the child is not yet able
to be and what the animal will never be (Gigon, 2002, pp. 63–64).
Clearly, humans are endowed with exceptional social, cognitive, and other psychological capacities. We
form cultures, use languages, and interact with one another, cooperatively, competitively, and in other
ways. The purported human-uniqueness of such abilities has long been considered adequate justification
for attributing to humans a moral status markedly superior to that granted to animals and for justifying
very different standards of treatment.
However, empirical studies from different scientific fields provide increasing evidence that certain animals
demonstrate at least some aspects of these phenomena. Accordingly, a review of the moral status and
treatment of such animals is warranted. In this article we review such evidence, focusing on animals’
cultural, linguistic, and psychological capacities. We examine the implications in two important cases: the

welfare of captive animals and the case for granting basic rights to animals, similar in some respects to
fundamental human rights.
Animal Cultures
Van Schaik and colleagues (2003) provided a broad definition of culture as “a system of socially
transmitted behavior” (p. 102). Whiten (2005) further specified that the culture of a community consists of
a unique array of traditions (p. 52). These traditions must demonstrate a certain level of complexity, they
must be transmitted to new individuals through specific learning mechanisms, and any spread to new
3
communities must not be attributable to ecologic or genetic causes.
Culture in Chimpanzees
Some chimpanzee traditions appear to meet these conditions. At least 39 traditional behavior patterns
have been identified among seven African chimpanzee study sites (Whiten et al., 1999). Results are
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assembled within the Behaviour Definition and Distribution Database, which collates available
information about these traditions, including the use of “leaf-sponges” to collect water and the so-called
hand-clasp, a special handholding position during grooming, which was the first documented social
tradition in chimpanzees (McGrew & Tutin, 1978). The best-known chimpanzee cultural traditions are
probably nut-cracking (Boesch & Boesch, 1983) and termite-fishing (Goodall, 1964).
Chimpanzee traditions are very complex. Chimpanzees use different tool sets for different tasks, including
different two-part sets when confronted with different types of insects and their mounds or nests (Sanz,
Call, & Morgan, 2009; Sanz, Morgan, & Gulick, 2004; Sanz, Schöning, & Morgan, 2009). They manipulate
and modify potential tools, for example, by removing parts, shortening them to appropriate lengths, or
abrading the materials. They use tools for very different purposes, and their traditions show both
technological and sociological aspects.
An interesting example recently reported by Hernandez-Aguilar, Moore, and Pickering (2007) was the use
of tools by savanna chimpanzees in Ugalla, Tanzania, for harvesting the underground storage organs of
plants such as root vegetables. This behavior is considered to have played a key role in the initial hominin
colonization of savanna habitats, in the development of the skull and tooth morphology of the genus
Australopithecus, and in the evolution of the genus Homo—the underground storage organs of plants
served as “fallback foods” in times when food was scarce (Hernandez-Aguilar et al., 2007, p. 19210).
The underlying learning mechanism of culture transmission in chimpanzees has been described as
utilizing a “master-apprenticeship” relationship (Matsuzawa et al., 2001). Although direct assistance or
active teaching by the skilled master is absent, such masters nevertheless interact socially with their
naive apprentices. They show unusually high levels of tolerance and allow long-term repetitive
observation, with access to tools.5 Captive chimpanzee mothers have been observed to offer tools to their
infants (Hirata, 2006, pp. 202, 209–211). In addition, infants selectively use the same tools chosen by
adults, which indicates that tool selectivity is transmitted (p. 211). Other experimental data on captive
chimpanzees similarly shows evidence of the transmission of traditions (Whiten, Horner, & de Waal,
2005).
As with human infants, learning by young free-living chimpanzees occurs at certain sensitive ages, within
very strong mother–infant interactions (Lonsdorf, 2006). However, human children appear more strongly
reliant on imitation, choosing to imitate actions demonstrated, even when it becomes obvious that such
actions will no longer achieve desired goals. In contrast, apes change from imitative to emulative
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behaviors—that is, flexible behaviors more likely to achieve such goals (Horner & Whiten, 2005).

Culture in Other Great Apes
Cultural traditions have also been described in other great apes. Van Schaik and colleagues reported at
least 19 highly complex behavioral patterns in orangutans in Borneo, serving a wide range of purposes
relating to the achievement of subsistence, comfort, or social communication (van Schaik et al., 2003; van
Schaik, van Noordwijk, & Wich, 2006). Tool use in free-living gorillas in northern Congo has been similarly
described. Examples include the use of sticks, branches, and trunks for different purposes, including as
walking sticks and as poles to determine water depth (Breuer, Ndoundou-Hockemba, & Fishlock, 2005).
Culture in Other Animals
Tool use is certainly not limited to great apes. Australian bottlenose dolphins, for example, use marine
sponges as foraging tools. Genetic analysis has indicated that transmission of this behavior occurs
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matrilinearly (Krützen, 2005).
New Caledonian crows are also skilled tool users, as was exemplified in a 2002 report from British
scientists (Weir, Chappell, & Kacelnik, 2002). A young female was observed using a wire to extract a
small bucket containing food from a tube. When at first she was unsuccessful using a straight piece of
wire, she bent the wire into a hook, with which she successfully extracted the bucket—despite no prior
experience with the material or situation. Hunt and Gray similarly reported that New Caledonian crows
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modify pandanus tools, from straight ones to a variety of stepped tools, ranging from single- to multistep
tools with greater efficiency (Hunt & Gray, 2003, pp. 867, 872–873). This could indicate diversification and
evolution of tool designs, although to date supporting examples have been described only in New
Caledonian crows and chimpanzees (Whiten, 2005, p. 53).
In some respects, tool use in New Caledonian crows seems to represent innate behavior. However,
social input nevertheless plays an important role in the transmission and evolution of specific techniques
and tool designs. Young crows in captivity, for example, prefer to use objects that they have observed a
human using (Kenward, Rutz, Weir, & Kacelnik, 2006, p. 1340; Kenward, Weir, Rutz, & Kacelnik, 2005).
9

Recently, even meta-tool use has been observed in New Caledonian crows. Taylor, Hunt, Holzhaider,
and Gray (2007) observed crows mastering recursive tasks, including the use of a short stick to extract a
longer stick, which was used in turn to extract food from a box.
Culture in Animals and Humans
Certain animal behaviors appear to meet reasonable definitions of culture, at least in the case of the
highly complex and socially transmitted traditions among chimpanzees and orangutans. Tool use in
cetaceans and corvidae, for example, also seems to possess cultural aspects.
Obviously, many (although not all) human cultural activities demonstrate great depth and complexity, as
evidenced by achievements such as elaborate artistic performances or creations and advanced
technological constructions. Yet such complexity is not necessary for the manifestation of culture
(Sommer, 2007). If it were, the cultures of many contemporary human and early hominin communities
could not be acknowledged as such.
In fact, human cultures are socially acquired, usually between birth and adulthood. Children pass through
all stages, from non-cultural newborns to encultured children and teenagers, during which time they
become progressively more aware of the traditions of their societies (e.g., Rogoff, 2003). On the other
hand, culture also represents behavioral patterns that have evolved over many generations. For example,
early hominin culture included ivory sculptures produced during the middle and late Pleistocene, more
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than 30,000 years ago (e.g., Conard, 2007), and Oldowan stone tools, which are about 2.5 million years
old (e.g., Semaw, 2000). Such cultural achievements have since evolved into those of modern art and
technology. Acknowledging the evolutionary and developmental progression of human culture overcomes
11
the common misperception that our culture is necessarily divorced from the natural world.

Animal Language
The characteristic most prominently used to argue for a moral distinction between humans and animals
12
has been our purportedly unique ability to speak. However, considerable research has investigated the
communicative abilities of animals.
Language in Chimpanzees
In 2007, one of the most famous contributors to chimpanzee linguistic studies passed away. By the time
of her death, Washoe the chimpanzee had successfully mastered around 250 distinctive American Sign
Language (ASL) signs, some of which she had taught to her adopted son Loulis and two other
chimpanzees. This was claimed to be the first animal-to-animal transfer of a human language. These
chimpanzees routinely used—and continue to use—ASL, vocalizations, and gestures in their interactions
with humans and each other.
Widespread initial excitement about Washoe’s reported language abilities (Gardner & Gardner, 1975)
was followed by several criticisms, including claims that Washoe’s apparent linguistic skills actually may
have been more reflective of the techniques used to teach her than of her innate abilities (Seidenberg &
Petitto, 1979). For some, however, Washoe’s various reputed abilities stimulated a fundamental
reexamination of chimpanzee psychology (Fouts, 2000).
Other apes also have communicated with humans using sign languages or symbols (via boards or
computers). Such apes have demonstrated their ability to use language creatively by inventing new
combinations of words (e.g., combining labels for “white” and “tiger” to describe a zebra and combining
labels for “listening” and “drinking” when confronted with a fizzy tablet in water), and they have
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generalized to new contexts words learned within a specific context.
Language in Monkeys
Animals’ communicative abilities are also demonstrated by their natural means of communication.
Perhaps the most complex examples of “proto-syntax” in animal communication discovered to date have
been described recently in Campbell’s monkeys (Ouattara, Lemasson, & Zuberbühler, 2009). These
monkeys vocalize six different types of alert calls, which are combined within long sequences in highly
context-specific ways. Stereotyped sequences convey information about group cohesion and travel,
falling trees, neighboring groups, non-predatory animals, nonspecific predatory threat, and specific
predator classes. Callers follow relatively sophisticated principles when concatenating sequences,
including nonrandom transitions between call types, incorporation of specific calls within existing
sequences to form new ones, and recombination of two sequences to form a third. Ouattara and
colleagues concluded that these primates have overcome some of the constraints of limited vocal control
through combinatorial organization.
Seyfarth and Cheney (1993) similarly described the use of different alarm calls for different predators in
vervet monkeys. It has been postulated that these alarm calls also fulfill the function of words with
semantic content.

Language in Dolphins
One of the most interesting acoustic and non-acoustic communication systems with language-like
features is dolphins’ use of whistles, echolocation clicks, and certain postures and behaviors. Although
related research remains in its infancy, it is already known, for example, that dolphins use signature
whistles for each individual, equivalent to names, which aptly demonstrates their awareness of the
individuality of other dolphins and themselves (Janik, Sayigh, & Wells, 2006; White, 2007, pp. 56–57, 96–
116, 141–146). Dolphins are also able to understand instructions given to them in artificial languages,
consisting of acoustic, computer-generated whistles or hand gestures. They seem to understand these
arbitrary symbols and the rules used to combine them because they follow instructions perfectly when a
sentence is semantically reversed. For example, to both humans and dolphins, the English sentence “Go
to the hoop at the surface and take it to the basket at the bottom” means something quite different when
“hoop” and “basket” are exchanged (White, 2007, pp. 96–116, especially p. 100, with reference to
Hermann, Richards, & Wolz, 1984).
Language in Parrots
Language comprehension studies in parrots are especially interesting because of their ability to
pronounce many human words. Irene Pepperberg worked with her African Grey parrot Alex for more than
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two decades, until his death in 2007 (Pepperberg, 2002, 2008). She described her use of the so-called
Modal-Rival Training System to introduce new words, which appears particularly effective: One person
acted as a trainer, and a second person acted as a model for Alex, as well as being a rival for the
attention of the trainer. When the model and rival engaged in a conversation about a new item, Alex
intruded, naming the item, apparently motivated by curiosity, jealousy, and a desire to regain the attention
of the trainer.
A flexible learning situation was created. The roles of the questioner and the respondent were reversed
among the humans, occasionally including the bird in interactions. Alex did not simply hear stepwise
vocal duets, “but rather observed a communicative process that involves reciprocity.” He learned that
communicating with the labels was an interplay—“a two way street in that one person is not always the
questioner and the other always the respondent”—and a process that “can be used to effect environment
change” (Pepperberg, 2002, pp. 26–29, esp. 26). He acquired, for example, names of different objects,
colors, materials, and numbers. Even short sentences (e.g., “wanna go” requests), as well as
interrogative pronouns, were part of his vocabulary. Additionally, he knew the words “color,” “same,” and
“different.”
When shown different toys, Alex demonstrated several skills related to object classification (Figure 1). He
was able to tell whether a toy fell within a certain category. If shown a red key and a yellow wooden cube,
for example, and asked, “What toy red?” he would answer, “Key!” But Alex could also classify objects with
respect to different categories. When shown the yellow wooden cube and asked, “What color?” he would
answer, “Yellow.” If asked, “What matter?” his answer was “wood.” Especially impressive was his ability to
classify objects as similar or different with respect to different categories. When confronted with a yellow
wooden cube and a yellow key and asked, “What’s same?” his answer was “color”—even if he had never
seen this color before. When asked, “What’s different?” he answered, “Matter” (Bartels, 2005, pp. 156–
186, especially 175–181; Pepperberg, 2002).
In over 80% of cases, Alex answered correctly when asked three different questions about the same
visible item.15 If he did not understand, he would have been expected to provide the same response in all
three cases or to give responses determined by chance. Alex thereby demonstrated the ability to modify

his response according to auditory stimuli from different questions, while the visual stimuli remained
constant (hence demonstrating independence from these visual stimuli).
The existence of concepts is closely linked to the existence of “meta-concepts.” For example, a speaker
who is aware that she or he has made a mistake must be able to have a thought now considered to be
correct, about a former belief now considered to be false (Tietz & Wild, 2006, p. 18). In a strict sense Alex
could not correct his reaction after receiving additional information, but he was able to modify it (Bartels,
2005, p. 178). Furthermore, his concepts were clearly organized in small networks, including main
categories such as color and subcategories such as yellow, red, and green (Pepperberg, 2002, p. 184).
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According to Andreas Bartels, who refers to Donald Davidson, these last two characteristics meet the
two most important criteria for the possession of concepts (Bartels, 2005, p. 178). Alex clearly had an
understanding of perception-based concepts, which, though different from human concepts, can
nevertheless be functionally interpreted and described (Bartels, 2005, pp. 11, 185–187; see similar in
Newen & Bartels, 2007). Alex’s concept for yellow, for example, had three functional roles: to indicate,
classify, and compare (see Figure 1 and Bartels, 2005, p. 184).
Figure 1: Alex, an African Grey parrot, demonstrated several skills related to object classification. According
to Bartels (2005), the parrot’s concepts can be described via functional roles.

Based on this philosophical interpretation of concepts, Alex possessed perceptionbased concepts, or
conceptual representations, which are organized within small networks and can be described functionally.
Although these are not nearly as complex as the concepts underlying human language, they can
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nevertheless be regarded as another important example of preliminary linguistic ability in an animal.
Without concepts there can be no language or linguistic capacity.
Animal Theory of Mind
Theory of mind is also a consciousness-based core capacity of human beings, and there is some
evidence of it in animals. The term theory of mind (ToM) describes a commonsense psychology (Bartsch
& Wellmann, 1995, p. 4). Those who have a ToM impute mental or psychological states to themselves
and others. Such states include beliefs and desires, as well as perceptual states such as seeing (Bischof18
Köhler, 2000, p. 9; Premack & Woodruff, 1978, p. 515). The assumption that everybody holds such

mental states serves to explain and predict social behavior and interaction (Bartsch & Wellmann, 1995, p.
5).
Theory of Mind in Chimpanzees
In crucial experiments investigating chimpanzee knowledge of perceptual states, groups of two
individuals competed for hidden food items (Hare, Call, Agnetta, & Tomasello, 2000; Hare, Call, &
Tomasello, 2001). In one of the tests, the subordinate chimpanzees could see the hiding process and
could also see whether the dominant chimpanzees had seen the hiding process, based on their doors
being opened or closed. The subordinates then avoided food that the dominants had observed being
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hidden but retrieved food that they had not (Hare et al., 2001; Tomasello, Call, & Hare, 2003a, p. 154).
This indicated that the subordinate chimpanzees knew the dominant chimpanzees had seen something at
an earlier time, knew that the dominant chimpanzees were likely to remain aware of this at a later time,
and knew that this awareness was likely to determine the dominant chimpanzees’ behavior.
The significance of these results remains under discussion. Whether they clearly indicate that
chimpanzees have a ToM is controversial (Povinelli & Vonk, 2003), but they do add to a weight of
accumulating evidence (Call & Tomasello, 2008; Tomasello et al., 2003a, p. 156; Tomasello, Call, &
Hare, 2003b). Combined evidence from multiple studies suggests that chimpanzees understand the
intentions, goals, visual (and sometimes auditory) perception, and knowledge of other chimpanzees.
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Even if there is no evidence (yet) of understanding false beliefs, they seem to understand others within
a perception–goal psychology (Call & Tomasello, 2008; Kaminski, Call, & Tomasello, 2008; Krachun,
Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2009).
Tomasello and colleagues (2003a) concluded that “chimpanzees—and perhaps other animal species—
possess a social-cognitive schema” (p. 156) that helps them understand something about the intentional
structure of behavior and about how perception influences it. This social-cognitive schema is clearly not a
“full-blown” or “human-like” ToM. On the other hand, Tomasello and colleagues concluded that it was
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“simply too sweeping” to understand ToM as something monolithic that exclusively incorporates human
cognitive characteristics, while completely excluding those of other species. They suggested that further
research should focus on determining which of the many different kinds of psychological states
chimpanzees are able to comprehend and on describing the extent to which they are able (p. 156).
The Incremental Progression of Cognitive, Social, and Psychological Capacities
As with culture and language, ToM consists of many different sociocognitive processes and abilities,
constituting a “toolkit” with different components or building blocks. False belief understanding may be a
core capacity, but there are other core capacities such as understanding perceptual states that are
included within the classical definition of ToM provided by Premack and Woodruff in 1978.
Reducing, for example, ToM to false-belief comprehension, culture to advanced technical specialization,
or language to grammar competence ignores the bundled character of cognitive, social, and
psychological abilities. Claiming that an individual possesses culture, language, or ToM only when
showing the full spectrum of subsumed capacities denies the incremental evolutionary and ontogenetic
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development of these abilities within and between species. Animals and humans who lack the full
spectrum of capacities yet, or who no longer possess them, are by definition excluded. Asserting that the
full spectrum must be congruent with the abilities of a healthy human adult is even more exclusive than
anthropocentrism—which discriminates in favor of all humans generally, rather than privileged subsets.
The failure of such claims is linked to their premises and unsatisfying definitions of cognitive, social, and
psychological abilities, rather than the application of cognition theory to animals.

The limitations of monolithic and exclusive conceptualizations of ToM, for example, are exemplified by
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examining ToM in children. The classical ToM test for children is called the Maxi Test, which reveals
children’s level of understanding of false beliefs. The test utilizes the following story: Maxi stores his
chocolate in the green kitchen cupboard, but while he is playing in the garden, his mother removes it to
the blue one. Children are then asked where Maxi will search for the chocolate when he returns to the
kitchen. Three-year-olds mostly answer, “In the blue cupboard,” whereas almost 50% of 4-year-olds and
more than 80% of 5-year-olds answer, “In the green cupboard.” Thus, based on this classical test
designed by Wimmer and Perner (1983), most 3-yearolds are unable to distinguish between their own
knowledge and that of Maxi. Even when alerted to the fact that Maxi did not witness his mother moving
the chocolate, they still expect him to search the blue cupboard. They have not yet perceived that
knowledge states depend on information received and that different people may therefore possess
different knowledge states and subsequently might harbor false beliefs if their knowledge is incomplete or
incorrect (for a brief discussion of the Maxi Test, see Kasten, 2005, pp. 134–137).
Results from false-belief tests indicate that children younger than 4 to 5 do not understand false beliefs
(Bischof-Köhler, 2000, p. 11; Kasten, 2005, p. 135). But does this mean that children younger than 4
years old do not possess a ToM? Is it instead possible that available tests may simply fail to show the
ToM abilities of children between 2 and 4 years of age?
There are obviously problems connected with false-belief tests such as the Maxi Test. Such tests
presuppose significant additional cognitive abilities (such as linguistic abilities, given that the tests are
normally language-based). They result only in a pass or fail and cannot provide quantitative measures of
ability. This correlates with monolithic conceptualizations of ToM as a characteristic entirely present or
entirely absent, which fails to detect or acknowledge its progressive development. As Workman and
Reader (2004) put it, “since the test24 is all-or-none . . . it has the effect of making what might be a gradual
developmental profile look like a sudden stage-like shift” (p. 128). Finally, although such tests examine
the relatively sophisticated understanding of false beliefs, and although such understanding may
constitute a cornerstone of ToM, it is far from being the only important characteristic. The limitations of
false-belief tests are increasingly acknowledged, with researchers expressing their disaffection with
existing paradigms in general and specifically. Gopnik and colleagues aptly expressed such sentiments:
“There is an unfortunate syndrome loose in developmental psychology: call it ‘neurotic task fixation’”
(Gopnik, Slaughter, & Meltzoff, 1994, cited by Hülsken, 2001, p. 7).
At least two lines of argument support approaching the ToM of children via other methods and applying
new theoretical frameworks. First, results from non-languagebased false-belief tests indicate that 15month-old infants already “possess (at least in a rudimentary and implicit form) a representational ToM:
they realize that others act on the basis of their beliefs and that these beliefs are representations that may
or may not mirror reality” (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005, p. 257). Similarly, Buttlemann, Carpenter, and
Tomasello (2009) presented positive results from an active helping paradigm, involving false-belief
understanding in 18-month-old infants.
Second, children younger than 4 are known to use mental verbs (e.g., “know,” “think,” and “believe”) and
other terms of mental reference in a meaningful way, in their everyday child language. Researching the
way children talk about the mind is made possible through linguistic databases such as the Child
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Language Data Exchange System (CHILDES), which contains transcribed conversations. Above all,
analyses of the data demonstrate that very young children use so-called contrastives: utterances that
mark different mental states within one sentence or a very small context. As defined by Bartsch and
Wellmann (1995),

Contrastive utterances, which distinguish a person’s thoughts and beliefs from other states of
affairs, potentially come in several overlapping varieties: Those contrasting belief with reality,
fiction with belief, one’s own mental state at one time with a later changed state, one’s own
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mental state with another’s, the contrasting mental states of two other people, and so on. (p. 44)
Such contrastive utterances might be of the form “I didn’t know X, but now I know X” or “You think X, but I
think Y.” According to Bartsch and Wellmann (1995), contrastives emerge in child language well before
the fourth birthday, at a mean age of 3 years. The children they studied were between 2 years 8 months
and 3 years 8 months when such utterances were first used (and they might have used them even earlier,
when no tape recorder was present; p. 47).
An analysis of the CHILDES data about two German girls named Caroline and Simone supports these
findings for the German child language: contrastives were used by Caroline at the age of 2 years and 1
month and by Simone at the age of 2 years and 7 months (Benz, 2004, pp. 50–59, 75–89, 106–108).
Caroline was 2 years and 5 months old when she participated in the following conversation with her
mother:
Table 1: Contrastive Use by Caroline (Age 2 years 5 months) in Conversation With Her Mother
German Dialogue

Translation by J. Benz-Schwarzburg

Mother:

Die Aysche sagt das finde ich aber
kein gutes Spiel.

Mother:

Aysche says that’s not a nice game.

Child:

Ich aber find lustig wenn Aysche runter
hoppala.

Child:

But I think it’s funny, when Aysche
falls down.

Mother:

Findest du lustig wenn die Aysche
runterfällt?

Mother:

You think it’s funny, when she falls to
the ground?

Child:

Ja und au.

Child:

Yes and ouch.

Note. The data has been modified marginally to improve readability, without changing the semantic content of
the utterances.

Caroline very clearly points out that she, in contrast to her mother, likes the idea of Aysche falling to the
ground. She even confirms her statement and indicates what she considers to be so funny: the fact that
Aysche hurts herself (Benz, 2004, p. 82).
The importance of this conversation becomes apparent when considering that most developmental
psychologists recently believed, or indeed still believe, that children younger than 3 1/2 to 4 lack a ToM.
Bischof-Köhler (2000) states,
Children under the age of three and a half years are naïve realists. . . . That is, they don’t
understand yet that their beliefs about facts are just beliefs that may represent those
circumstances appropriately as well as inappropriately. They also take it for granted as a matter
of course that other persons live in the same reality and that they percept and know exactly the
same things they do. They don’t apprehend yet that other persons can hold different opinions on
the same fact. . . . This changes when a theory of mind appears at about the age four.” (p. 11,
see similar p. 34, translation J. Benz-Schwarzburg)
This viewpoint is clearly rendered incorrect by Caroline’s narrative and similar data.

Research on ToM in animals as well as infants has demonstrated that this complex phenomenon cannot
correctly be considered an all-or-nothing trait. This is similarly true for other higher cognitive abilities
(DeGrazia, 2006, p. 42). Moreover, the human ToM does not suddenly appear but emerges gradually
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during ontogeny. Children already possess some of its components before the age of 4, as shown by
nonlinguistic tasks and contrastive utterances (Bartsch & Wellmann, 1995, p. 47; Benz, 2004, pp. 106–
108; Buttlemann et al., 2009; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). It therefore seems appropriate to reject
monolithic concepts of ToM, at least when considering the evolution and ontogeny of social cognition
(Tomasello et al., 2003b, p. 240).
Disregarding these arguments leads to an unsatisfying simplification of the phenomenon of ToM and
inhibits comparative research between species or between different age or ability groups (such as healthy
vs. otherwise) within species. However, accepting the conceptual and methodological challenges of
defining and testing cognitive abilities yields important implications for future research: we need
nonlinguistic false-belief tests for children and animals (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005, p. 257) and speciesappropriate tests in general. We should abandon all-or-nothing test designs that correlate with monolithic
conceptualizations of cognitive abilities and should instead focus on their incrementally progressive
character.
Ethical Implications of Animal Abilities
The moral consideration afforded to animals is markedly less than that afforded to most humans
(exceptions may include, for example, victims of major human rights violations). The main justifications for
such profound differences in moral consideration and treatment depend on major purported differences in
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cognitive and related psycho-sociological capacities, such as culture, language, and ToM. However,
studies increasingly suggest the existence of such characteristics—or at least of important aspects of
these and other cognitive abilities—in some animal species. Additionally, as pointed out by Rogers and
Kaplan (2004), we must consider that “only a handful of species have been researched and current
findings would suggest that many more species might be found to have exceptional cognitive abilities, if
we only looked” (p. 193).
To what extent has such changing awareness altered the human–animal relationship? Unfortunately, to
date the answer remains “very little.” Although the cognitive relationship of some animals to humans is far
closer than previously believed, on the whole we continue to treat such cognitive relatives as moral
strangers, denying them moral consideration to an extent very rarely applied to our fellow human beings.
Acknowledging this changing awareness of animal abilities yields a range of implications, from the basic
to the profound. One basic implication is that the psychological needs of captive animals should be
adequately met. However, this presupposes that keeping animals in captivity is ethically defensible, as
long as welfare standards are upheld.
A more profound implication is that welfare considerations alone may not suffice and that consideration of
basic rights may be morally warranted for species such as great apes and dolphins with whom we share
major characteristics of personhood. The granting of such rights might, for example, disallow the
involuntary confinement of such animals in captivity. Each of these implications is examined in the
following sections.
Environmental Enrichment for Captive Animals
Although it has long been understood that involuntary confinement may fail to meet the physiological
needs of captive animals, it is increasingly understood that the advanced cognitive, other psychological,
and social characteristics of some species may make it very difficult to cater adequately to their

psychological needs in captivity. The great apes—our closest nonhuman relations—provide obvious
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examples. As Rogers and Kaplan (2004) have asserted, “the ultimate aim must surely be that we do not
just want animals to survive but want them to have a quality of life commensurate with their needs and
dignity: physical, psychological, social, and cultural” (p. 196).
Zoos are increasingly aware of such psychological, social, and cultural needs of captive animals, and
increasing numbers of modern zoos have accordingly attempted to enrich their lives by providing them
with additional stimuli (see Jantschke, 1997, p. 406). Common examples include the introduction of novel
items to enclosures, or the provision of visual and olfactory cues. Such interventions are directed at
stimulating curiosity-driven or investigative behavior, which results in mental and physical activity or
exercise and decreases stereotypical and undesirable behavior indicative of chronic stress (see Hutchins,
Kleiman, Geist, & McDade, 2003, pp. 203–204). Since 2009, Great apes at the Leipzig Zoo in Germany,
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for example, have been provided with so-called shaking-boxes, rotary discs, and food-knots.
Unfortunately, however, environmental enrichment efforts remain poor or absent in many institutions
internationally. And the ethical case for enrichment has scarcely been addressed by philosophers to
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date.
An exception is David DeGrazia (1996, pp. 258–297, especially pp. 294–297). His arguments are
grounded in the basic principle of non-maleficence, which exhorts us “not to cause extensive
unnecessary harm to others without their consent.” This principle is further elaborated within 15 rules, 2 of
which directly address the keeping of animals in zoos: Rule 3 is “don’t cause significant suffering for the
sake of your or others’ enjoyment,” and rule 14 is “provide for the basic physical and psychological needs
of the zoo animal, and ensure that she has a comparably good life to what she would likely have if in the
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wild” (pp. 258–281). This last rule clearly asserts psychological needs and the necessity of providing
comparable life conditions. DeGrazia’s ethical evaluation of zoos according to these principles provides
the conclusion that in most cases they can adequately provide for their animals’ needs, even if too few
presently do (pp. 290, 296).
However, adequately catering for certain animals is rendered particularly difficult by their advanced
cognitive, psychological, and social characteristics. According to DeGrazia (1996), keeping great apes in
zoos is ethically defensible only if zoos can guarantee family preservation, considerable space, and highly
enriched environments, containing ample opportunities for climbing, exploring, problem-solving, and
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playing (p. 297). In such cases psychological needs arising from cognitive abilities are central to
assessments of welfare, demonstrating the necessity of species-specific welfare assessments and
species-appropriate environmental enrichment. Again, underlying all such considerations, however, is the
assumption that keeping animals in captivity is ethically defensible, as long as welfare standards are
upheld.
Rights and Responsibilities Implied by Cognitive, Psychological, and Social Abilities
Do we, however, owe animals more than best-practice welfare standards? After all, animals such as great
apes possess to varying degrees cognitive, psychological, communicative, and social attributes once
considered uniquely human, characteristics that have previously served to support the establishment of
human rights. The following question therefore arises: Is it ethically justifiable at all to subject such
animals to involuntary confinement within zoos or elsewhere?
Interestingly, DeGrazia (1996) rejects keeping dolphins in zoos because of the practical impossibility of
providing them with surroundings in aquatic exhibits sufficiently comparable to those of their natural
habitats (p. 297). In doing so he establishes a moral line, beyond which even compliance with the best

welfare standards cannot be considered adequate to justify the involuntary confinement of certain
species.
Thomas White (2007) describes his view of this moral line by noting that our expectations of certain
treatment standards from other people stem from our self-identification as “self-conscious, unique
individuals who are vulnerable to a wide range of physical and emotional pain and harm, and who have
the power to reflect upon and choose our actions.” Because we value these traits so deeply, we rarely
consider it acceptable for other people to hurt, coerce, threaten, or manipulate us.
We object to such actions so strongly that we label them not just “inconvenient” or “unpleasant,”
but as “wrong.” Ethics—our labeling actions as “right” or “wrong”—is grounded in the idea that the
type of consciousness that we have gives us special capacities and vulnerabilities. When we
label something as “wrong,” then, we’re saying that it crosses the line with regard to not
respecting some fundamental feature that makes us human. (White, 2007, p. 155)
Immanuel Kant described certain human core characteristics as providing sufficient justification for the
granting of inalienable human rights. He asserted that the human being is an end in itself (German:
Selbstzweck) and has dignity (German: Würde). Kant (1785/2008) deduced that there are conditions and
expressions of (well-)being and personhood that a person should never be deprived of (p. 65; see also
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Hilpert, 1998, p. 675, and footnote 41).
Similarly, the advanced cognitive, psychological, and social abilities of animals such as dolphins and
great apes confer special capacities and vulnerabilities on them, including a profound ability to suffer
when deprived of fundamental psychological or social requirements. Increasing numbers of ethicists and
biologists argue that these animals share with us fundamental characteristics of personhood, such as
consciousness and self-consciousness, a wide range of cognitive abilities (including those giving rise to
culture, language, ToM, and other abilities such as episodic memory), and the capacity to experience a
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wide range of emotional states (including, for example, happiness, fear, and empathy). It is therefore
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arguably more accurate to consider such animals as nonhuman persons, who should be granted at
least basic rights concordant with those granted to humans. One implication is that the moral boundary
that ethical actors are obliged to respect is violated when these animals are subjected to a range of
contemporary human purposes, such as confinement within zoos and involuntary participation within
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biomedical research.
The Great Ape Project, founded by Peter Singer and Paola Cavalieri, similarly argues for an extension of
the “community of equals” to include all great apes. It calls for equivalence of basic rights among all
members, including the right to life, the protection of individual liberty, and the prohibition of torture. The
project was primarily founded in recognition of the moral significance of the cognitive abilities of great
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apes. It relies on the proximity of specifically their cognitive characteristics to those of humans, rather
than phylogenetic characteristics generally—thereby implying that the community of moral consideration
is potentially open to species beyond those evolutionarily close to humans, such as elephants, cetaceans,
or corvidae (Cavalieri & Singer, 1994, pp. 8–9, 463–476; similarly White, 2007, p. 11).
Despite morally important similarities, such species obviously differ from human persons (as they do from
each other). Nevertheless, they could be included within such a community of moral consideration. After
all, so-called marginal human persons, such as the very young, old, injured, or ill, who lack the full range
of psychological and social characteristics and abilities exhibited by healthy human adults, are
nevertheless valued as persons. They are valued as partially conscious, partially self-conscious, or
partially autonomous beings, with unique personalities, and are accordingly granted human rights.

It appears logically consistent to assign similar moral significance to comparable grades or stages of
mental complexity in animals who possess them.
This need not necessarily imply that such nonhuman persons should be granted rights and
responsibilities equivalent to those of normal human adults. The same is true of children or the mentally
ill, for example. Although we may grant such people rights to life, liberty, and freedom from serious
abuses such as torture, we do not necessarily stress their right or responsibility to work or their equality
before the law. On the contrary, we grant them exemptions from certain social responsibilities, such as
protection from child labor, and exemptions from, or mitigations of, judicial punishment. The United
Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child asserts such child-specific needs and rights. A Declaration
of the Rights of Great Apes could similarly assert their specific needs and inalienable rights.
Conclusions
The Kantian foundation for human rights stems from the ideal of the rational person and the principle that
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every person is equally rational, self-conscious, and autonomous. However, the case for the equal
application of human rights transcends this core idea. No matter how equal all humans actually are, all
are considered equal in dignity and rights. Modern civilized societies aim to extend such moral
equivalence to all human beings, no matter where they live, the color of their skin, their gender, their
culture, or their cognitive capacities. Almost every country has now ratified the Charter of the United
Nations, which recognizes the existence of human rights and calls for their respect and practical
implementation. Most have also incorporated basic human rights within their national laws.
Such moral and social progress has been hard-won and reached only after millennia of social injustice.
We should value and defend the gains we have made and seek further progress where warranted. In
many countries grave human rights violations continue on a daily basis, demonstrating the need for
further progress. Additionally, as ethical actors we may consciously choose whether to grant moral
consideration and personhood status to beings who do not yet possess, who have possessed and lost, or
who may never possess the full suite of relevant psychological and social attributes displayed by healthy
human adults.
Existing evidence supports the inclusion within the moral community of persons of those animals who
share with us major characteristics of personhood. What about animals whose personalities or cognitive
capacities are more different from our own, however? The diversity of animals’ cognitive, psychological,
and social capacities yields a dilemma: such characteristics are clearly morally relevant in justifying
inalienable—and hence indivisible—rights, consistent with the granting of such rights to humans; yet
those same characteristics are distributed throughout the animal kingdom, where the differences of
degree are frequently small. By assigning such inalienable and indivisible rights to some species but
denying them completely to others, we would impose a profound all-or-nothing division on a large and
diverse array of living creatures, who may differ only incrementally in the extent to which they exhibit the
necessary characteristics.
Thus, frameworks such as the Great Ape Project should be considered only the beginning of a more
fundamental process of reconsideration: If basic human rights such as the rights to life, liberty, and
freedom from torture are relevant when morally significant cognitive, psychological, and social abilities are
present in other species, then it follows logically that this should lead to corresponding inalienable rights.
However, not all rights will hold the same importance for all species. Interspecies variation of morally
relevant characteristics justifies the establishment of species-appropriate subgroups of rights. Some
rights are more broadly applicable than others. The prohibition of torture, for example, is morally

warranted for all species able to experience significant suffering or other adverse effects accruing from
such abuse—whether or not they possess the psychological criteria for personhood.
Classical concepts of personhood rely on the possession of human-like psychological characteristics. On
the one hand, the identification of such characteristics within animals, and those animals’ subsequent
inclusion within the community of moral consideration, facilitates their protection from a range of human
abuses. On the other hand, focusing solely on human-like characteristics is intrinsically anthropocentric.
We should also consider the possibility that some species might satisfy less anthropocentric definitions of
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personhood. White (2007) prefers to conceptualize dolphins as “alien beings” (pp. 12, 155–184) : Their
perception of the marine world, communication, and social interactions are very different from our own.
Yet these characteristics are not necessarily of lesser importance when determining moral standing.
Where reasonable doubt remains about the existence of morally relevant animal characteristics, as
ethical actors we should afford such animals the benefit of that doubt.
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Notes
1. The term “cognition” is used in many different ways. Fundamentally, it refers to “mental processes that
are presumed to occur within the animal, but which cannot be observed directly” (McFarland, 2006, p.
32). However, this is a very broad definition—“cognitive” then becomes very similar to “psychological.” To
define the term more precisely, McFarland’s Oxford Dictionary of Animal Behavior identifies both strict
and more general meanings: “In its stricter sense, cognition refers to a particular kind of knowledge:
namely ‘knowing that’ rather than ‘knowing how.’ Cognition is the manipulation of explicit knowledge. In its
more general sense, cognition refers to any kind of mental abstraction of which an animal seems to be
capable. . . . In the study of navigation, problem solving, social interactions, deceit, language, and thinking
in animals, scientists have found it necessary to postulate cognitive processes” (p. 32). To emphasize the
mental abstraction underlying phenomena such as culture, language, and theory of mind, we generally
intend the latter, more general definition when referring to cognition.
2. The systematic study of animal cognition first evolved during the late 1970s, when Donald Griffin (1976)
established cognitive ethology as a biological subdiscipline. Increasing numbers of philosophers engaged
in the topic in the 1970s and 1980s (see Perler & Wild, 2005). The publication of key texts by
philosophers such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan helped develop the related field of animal ethics.
3. Traditions are defined as behavior patterns that are customary or habitual in at least one site, but
absent elsewhere (Whiten, 2005, p. 52, Figure 1). They are shared by two or more individuals within a
social unit, they persist over time, and new practitioners acquire them in part through socially aided
learning (Whiten, 2005, p. 53, with reference to Fragaszy & Perry, 2003).

4. See the homepage of the Behaviour Definition and Distribution Database (http://culture .stand.ac.uk/chimp/) and Whiten (2005), p. 53.
5. According to Matsuzawa and his colleagues (2001), the master–apprentice relationship includes longterm repetitive exposure to a problem, which stimulates a strong motivation within the apprentice to
imitate the behavior of the master. High levels of tolerance by the master are also apparent. They believe
this combination to be very educationally effective. They note that some human educational traditions,
such as teaching the Japanese art of sushi making, include these elements—deliberately excluding
verbal explanation, written instruction, or other assistance. The sushi apprentice, for example, is
traditionally forbidden to touch utensils, rice, fish, or other ingredients for years during the initial training.
The apprentice just carefully observes the master, “until one day the master suddenly gives him
permission to attempt making his first sushi. It is no exaggeration to say that the apprentice produces
exquisite sushi from the start” (p. 573). Matsuzawa and colleagues also note that the word “educate”
originates from “educe” (Latin: educere), which means “to extract.” “Education” thus refers to “the drawing
forth of one’s potential abilities.” Although active teaching is regarded to be the most advanced form of
education in many societies, it may be neither the only means of educating nor necessarily the best in
every circumstance. Matsuzawa and colleagues consider that such active teaching may not stimulate
student motivation as effectively as the master–apprentice relationship described (pp. 572–573).
6. Horner and Whiten (2005) explored the tendency of both young chimpanzees from an African
sanctuary and 3- to 4-year-old children to use emulation or imitation to solve a problem using tools, and
examined whether their tendency to choose either strategy was determined by the availability of causal
information. Both groups observed a human demonstrator use a tool to retrieve a reward from a puzzle
box: “The demonstration involved both causally relevant and irrelevant actions, and the box was
presented in each of two conditions: opaque and clear. In the opaque condition, causal information about
the effect of the tool inside the box was not available, and hence it was impossible to differentiate
between the relevant and irrelevant parts of the demonstration. However, in the clear condition causal
information was available, and subjects could potentially determine which actions were necessary. When
chimpanzees were presented with the opaque box, they reproduced both the relevant and irrelevant
actions, thus imitating the overall structure of the task. When the box was presented in the clear condition
they instead ignored the irrelevant actions in favor of a more efficient, emulative technique. These results
suggest that emulation is the favored strategy of chimpanzees when sufficient causal information is
available. However, if such information is not available, chimpanzees are prone to employ a more
comprehensive copy of an observed action. In contrast to the chimpanzees, children employed imitation
to solve the task in both conditions, at the expense of efficiency. We suggest that the difference in
performance of chimpanzees and children may be due to a greater susceptibility of children to cultural
conventions, perhaps combined with a differential focus on the results, actions and goals of the
demonstrator” (p. 164).
7. Through the maternal line.
8. Little “spears” made of thorny leaves that are used to extract insects from holes in trunks.
9. The application of one tool to another.
10. Oldowan stone tools were first discovered at the Olduvai Gorge in Tanzania. They were used by
prehistoric hominins of the Lower Paleolithic era and are the oldest manufactured tools discovered to
date.

11. The word “nature” is derived from the Latin word natura, which implies “essential qualities or innate
disposition” or, more literally, “birth” (Latin: nasci). The word “culture” (Latin: cultura) stems from colere
and means “to cultivate” (Hoad, 1991, pp. 108, 309). Throughout the history of philosophy and
anthropology, nature and culture have been described as occupying separate spheres. Human cultures
have been considered divorced from nature or from animal societies and behaviors (Grant, 1996, pp.
206–207). However, if culture is part of nature in the sense that “natural beings” (animals, as well as early
hominins) also display or displayed cultural behavior, then definitions of culture as behavioral patterns
present solely in modern humans, and absent in nature and other animals, become invalid.
12. Aristotle defined the human being as zoon logon echon—the being who is endowed with reason and
speech (the Greek term logos refers to both). This characterization has proven very persistent throughout
the history of philosophy and science. Hoffmann (2007) states that the possession of language and
speech (or of central characteristics thereof) have “almost always” been claimed to be uniquely human (p.
21). Very often, language is linked to thinking in general and is used as diffentia specifica to differentiate
humans from other animals (Hoffmann cites examples provided by the Stoic philosophers, Descartes,
Herder, Humboldt, Popper, and Eccles). Some scientists claim that language acquisition and linguistic
abilities are connected to special sociocultural traits, which are more or less exclusive to human cultures
and societies. Hoffman analyzes this position in regard to Herder and Humboldt but also mentions the
theories of Wygotski, Wittgenstein, Tomasello, Lieberman, and others.
13. For a summary of primate language-training experiments, see Klann-Delius (1999), pp. 81–85. For
reviews of animal linguistic abilities describing word invention and generalization, see Gould and Gould
(1999), pp. 170–191, and Hauser (2001), pp. 215–259.
14. Pepperberg also worked successfully and still works with other African Grey parrots.
15. For Alex’s ability to categorize with respect to color and shape, see Pepperberg (2002), p. 58. For his
discrimination between same and different, including his transfer abilities with respect to new items, see
p. 73. For his understanding of the labels, and of relative concepts, see pp. 125–167.
16. Donald Davidson (1982) writes in his essay “Rational Animals” that whether a dog can believe that an
object is a tree depends on whether she or he has certain general beliefs about trees (that they need soil
and water, have leaves or needles, are growing, etc.). According to Davidson, beliefs are located within a
dense network of related beliefs such as this (pp. 320–321). Davidson further argues that in order to have
a belief, it is necessary to have the concept of belief, which includes beliefs about beliefs (p. 324). He
explains, “Much of the point of the concept of belief is that it is the concept of a state of an organism
which can be true or false, correct or incorrect. To have the concept of belief is therefore to have the
concept of objective truth” (p. 326). Davidson himself rejects the idea that any animal has concepts.
Interestingly, Bartels (2005) and Newen and Bartels (2007) describe how some of his ideas can
nevertheless be used to describe Alex’s abilities.
17. It is very difficult to compare language-like or concept-like abilities in animals because very different
aspects have been researched in a very diverse range of species, and interpretational frameworks that
might facilitate comparison are lacking. Given that concepts or sentence-based concepts are cognitive
information processes, distinctions between animals could be made by referring to different classes of
informational processes (see Newen & Bartels, 2007). Quite complex behavioral routines may result from
noncognitive information processes, which do not necessarily imply concepts. These are typically
stimulated by a consistent physical stimulus and trigger a consistent behavioral response (reflexes are a
subcategory). No stable representation is formed that may be transferred to other contexts (Newen &
Bartels, 2007, p. 294). Cognitive information processes, however, entail nonconceptual, conceptual, and

sentence-based or propositional representations. Nonconceptual representations are, for example,
involved in the homing behavior of ants: “The spatial orientation of the ant is based on registering the
position of the sun and registering the movements of its own legs. . . . If you transfer the ant to a new
location at the moment it finds some food, it will start to run in the direction that would have been the right
one given its previous location. The representation of the location relative to its nest that is built in one
context is also used in a new context. . . . This indicates that the ant has built a stable representation of its
spatial relation to the nest” (Newen & Bartels, 2007, pp. 294–295). Newen and Bartels (2007) conclude
that “although the homing behavior is rather flexible . . . it is nevertheless essentially dependent on key
stimuli and is not based on the capacity of object identification. The lack of object representations is the
main reason to claim that, in the case of the ant, the underlying representation is only a nonconceptual
one” (p. 295). Real conceptual information systems (see our discussion on Alex) can identify and reidentify objects and properties and show a relative stimulus independence and a certain level of
abstraction. Classification here is more than stimulus generalization; it involves class formation and the
existence of minimal semantic nets (see Newen & Bartels, 2007, p. 295). An even more sophisticated
category of representations is that of sentence-based or propositional concepts. Newen and Bartels
(2007) state that these concepts can so far only be ascribed to humans and the bonobo Kanzi, who is
trained to formulate sentences via symbol combination. Kanzi can describe events that occurred when
the listener was absent and can express desires (e.g., to walk through a forest via a specific route). They
note, “Assuming . . . that the description of Kanzi’s capabilities is essentially correct, Kanzi is a
paradigmatic case of an animal that has propositional representations because he has conceptual
representations . . . and he produces compositional representations for describing events or for
expressing his desires. Moreover, there is evidence that his symbolic system forms a basic natural
language, partly because he can understand human natural language to a remarkable degree” (pp. 300–
301).
18. “In saying that an individual has a theory of mind, we mean that the individual imputes mental states
to himself and to others. . . . A system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory, first,
because such states are not directly observable, and second, because the system can be used to make
predictions, specifically about the behavior of other organisms” (Premack & Woodruff, 1978, p. 515).
19. Moreover, they adjusted their behavior accordingly when such a dominant individual was replaced
with another one who had not witnessed the baiting procedure, thereby demonstrating their ability to keep
track of precisely who has witnessed what. Similarly, ravens and scrub jays, for example, seem to
possess cognitive representations of what they believe observing conspecifics to know. They accordingly
adjust their own caching strategies, to minimize potential pilfering (see, e.g., Bugnyar & Heinrich, 2005;
Emery & Clayton, 2001).
20. Someone who understands that beliefs may be false grasps the special relation between mental state
and reality: mental states are not direct reflections of reality, but representations, which may or may not
be accurate. Thus, understanding false beliefs is considered a “cornerstone of social competence”
(Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005, p. 255). It clearly represents the developmental change from a
nonrepresentational to a representational ToM.
21. By “monolithic” we mean, with reference to Tomasello et al. (2003a), intrinsically indivisible.
22. Charles Darwin (1879/2004) stated in chapter 6 of The Descent of Man that “the mental faculties of
man and the lower animals do not differ in kind, although immensely in degree.” He concluded that “a
difference in degree, however great, does not justify us in placing man in a distinct kingdom” (p. 173). He
rejected the idea of a linear scala naturae, proceeding from “lower animals” to humans as the “pride of
creation.” Darwin clearly applied ideas of continuity and gradualism to animal abilities and characteristics

and overthrew the dogma of separate creation. Yet although he denied fundamental differences in kind,
Darwin’s theory of evolution nevertheless allows the possibility that many gradual steps can eventually
lead to profound differences, including with respect to mental capacities (for a good discussion of Darwin
and his theories, see Engels, 2007, especially pp. 66–68, 74–76, 146–158, 166, and 197–204). However,
according to the theory of evolution, species are ideally matched to their biological niches, and additional
development would frequently constitute a biologically unjustified expenditure of energy. Describing
animals as “higher” or “lower” in a normative way fails to adequately reflect this reality. Additionally,
Darwin’s theory allows the possibility of convergent evolution, resulting, for example, in complex mental
faculties in animals, such as birds, to whom we are only distantly related.
23. This test is also known as the Location-Change Task. It was developed by Wimmer and Perner (1983)
and modified by Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985), who named it the SallyAnne Test. Other falsebelief tests are the Deceptive-Box Test and the Appearance-Reality Test (see Call & Tomasello, 1999, p.
381).
24. This refers to the false-belief test in its several versions.
25. See http://childes.psy.cmu.edu
26. For the different types of contrastives, see Bartsch & Wellmann (1995), p. 32, and Shatz, Wellmann,
and Silber (1983), p. 309.
27. Growth and development.
28. Throughout the history of philosophy and anthropology, the human being has always been
characterized by the formula “the human is an animal plus X” (Wild, 2008, p. 26). According to this
formula, humans have, for example, been characterized as the rational animal, the animal endowed with
language and hands, or the animal who forms communities (Aristotle) and as the animal who has a soul
(Descartes); has the ability to reason, including moral reasoning (Kant); has knowledge about death
(Hölderlin); or has extraordinary adaptive abilities (Dostojewskij). Humans have been described as the
animal who is not fixed (Nietzsche), who has an eccentric position (Plessner), or who has a world
(Heidegger; see Wild, 2008, p. 26). Several books provide an overview or discussion of these and other
classical characterizations that rely on purported cognitive, social, and psychological differences between
humans and animals. Matthew Calarco’s (2008) book Zoographies, for example, challenges the
anthropocentrism of the Continental philosophical tradition and calls for the abolition of classical versions
of the human–animal distinction. Schütt (1990) presents the main classical writings on animals’
(supposedly absent) rationality, from Plato to Schopenhauer. Perler and Wild (2005) and Lurz (2009)
concentrate on publications from the 20th and 21st centuries (e.g., addressing language, beliefs,
representation, behavior, communication, mind-reading, and consciousness in animals). Kalof and
Fitzgerald’s The Animals Reader: The Essential Classic and Contemporary Writings (2007) presents a
variety of perspectives on animals and humans, ranging from Aristotle to postmodern philosophers and
from orangutans to cyborgs. It also contains contributions from a large range of cultural historians,
ecological writers, and contemporary animal rights activists. An even more detailed approach to the
human–animal relationship is given by the six volumes of the Cultural History of Animals, covering 4,500
years of human–animal interaction, from Antiquity to the Modern Age. Each volume also explores
philosophical beliefs of the time (Kalof & Resl, 2007).
29. Because of length constraints, we restricted this discussion mainly to the example of great apes.
Furthermore, animal cognition research has clearly been primatocentric (Rogers & Kaplan, 2004, p. 195),

and ethical discussions often mirror this bias. We acknowledge, however, that many of the arguments
presented here could similarly be applied to a range of other captive species.
30. See http://wkprc.eva.mpg.de/english/files/enrichment.htm
31. Additionally, not all problems associated with confining wild animals within zoos can be solved by
environmental enrichment or other welfare improvements. Fundamental problems remain with zoos and
the arguments used to legitimize them, some of which are explored in the following section. Another
example is the purported conservation role of zoos, as promulgated by the World Association of Zoos and
Aquariums and others. However, critics note that many zoos in late modernity are undergoing crucial
changes, which are contrary to this conservation vision, and are very ethically problematic. It has been
claimed that a “Disneyization” of zoos is observable, in which the major foci are entertainment and
commercialization (see Beardsworth & Bryman, 2001).
32. DeGrazia derives his rules from his first principle—the principle of nonmaleficence, which asserts that
we should not cause “extensive unnecessary harm” to others. Rule 3 prohibits causing significant
suffering for the sake of enjoyment. Hence, enjoyment is considered by DeGrazia to be a potential reason
for causing harm that lacks sufficient necessity. This is highly relevant to the range of harms that zoos
cause to their animals, given that a major purpose of zoos remains human entertainment.
33. However, DeGrazia’s list was not exhaustive. Opportunities for foraging behavior, for example, should
also be provided.
34. We believe that beings with sufficient characteristics should qualify for the status of personhood. We
agree with Kant and others that such persons should posses certain inalienable rights, which are
theoretically unable to be repudiated, surrendered, annulled, or transferred—that is, alienated, in any
way. Nevertheless, we also recognize that scenarios existing in the real world (or even other theoretical
worlds) may conflict with such theoretical ideals. For example, individuals may deliberately violate the
rights of others, for personal gain. We do not consider such actions to be morally excusable. Individuals
may also violate the rights of others as a result of unconscious reflexes—for example, in self-defense—or
as a result of deliberate, rational choices, such as to achieve utilitarian objectives (when defending the
equivalent rights of a greater number of others). In cases such as these, we consider such violations of
otherwise inalienable rights to be morally excusable.
35. For evidence of emotional abilities in animals, see Bekoff (2007). It is possible that the ability to
experience emotional states such as empathy may be a prerequisite for understanding and adhering to
moral codes of behavior. For evidence of fairness in animals, see Bekoff (2007), pp. 85–109. For
evidence of altruistic helping in chimpanzees, see Warneken and Tomasello (2006).
36. White (2007) uses the term “non-human persons,” as does the Great Ape Project. DeGrazia (2006)
prefers the term “borderline persons.” Along with White and the Great Ape Project (Cavalieri & Singer,
1994), others such as Wise (2000) and Diamond (2006) have questioned contemporary perceptions of
the moral status of animals, or their legal status as human property (e.g., Francione, 1995).
37. Such experiments are mostly intended to benefit humans. However, large-scale systematic reviews
have consistently demonstrated that their human benefits are usually minimal (Knight, 2007, 2008a,
2008c; Lindl, Völkel, & Kolar, 2005), and a growing range of non-animal alternative research
methodologies exist or are being developed (Knight, 2008b).
38. See Cavalieri and Singer (1994), especially pp. 8 and 12, as well as http://en.wikipedia
.org/wiki/Great_Ape_Project

39. There are different traditions underlying the concept of human dignity, including religious ones
(asserting that human dignity derives from the creation of humans in the image of god); secular,
philosophical ones (relying mainly on reasoning capacity or “natural law” to justify special moral status);
and more empirical and historical ones (deducing the idea of human rights ex negativo from seeking to
prevent recurrences of injustice); see Bayertz (1999). Similarly, traditions of human rights are diverse,
ranging, for example, from liberal to naturalistic or ontological ones, and referring to ideas such as those
deriving from transcendental philosophy or discourse theory (see Hilpert, 1998, pp. 674–675). However,
despite traditional variety, modern secular foundations of human rights adhere closely to the philosophy
of enlightenment and mainly to Kantian ideas (see, e.g., Hilpert, 1998, p. 675; similarly Bayertz, 1999, p.
824; Ganslandt, 1995, p. 847; Klenner, 1990, p. 367). Additionally, modern and postmodern philosophy
linked the idea of human dignity and rights to the status of the person. Here again, influences came, for
example, from Boethius, Rawls, and mainly Locke, but the most fundamental and eminent refinement
goes back to Kant, who first conceptualized a direct connection between personhood and human rights
within the Second Maxim (German: Selbstzweckformel) of his categorical imperative (see Sturma, 2002).
40. White refers to Diana Reiss (1990), who described dolphins as “an alien intelligence” (Reiss, 1990, p.
32).
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